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Previous studies on intra-party competition have largely neglected the role played by 
geographic distance between co-partisan candidates. In this study, we argue that 
candidates who live further away from intra-party competitors on the same party list 
benefit electorally from their remoteness. Moreover, we contend that the electoral 
effectiveness of exhibiting local personal vote attributes – a theoretically and empirically 
well-established candidate strategy to cultivate personal votes – also depends on the 
geographical proximity of localized co-partisan candidates. Using a unique and untapped 
dataset of more than 5,000 Finnish election candidates’ home address coordinates over 
four consecutive parliamentary elections (1999–2011), we run beta regression models to 
examine the effects of candidate remoteness and nearest candidates’ local characteristics 
on intra-party vote shares. To measure the remoteness of a particular candidate, we 
develop a novel index based on the distribution of co-partisans over concentric circles 
around that candidate. The empirical analyses show that the effect of geographic 
remoteness depends on local party strength and the degree of urbanization: candidates 
particularly benefit from more distant co-partisans in party strongholds and rural and 
suburban municipalities.  Moreover, all models confirm that nearby located localized co-
partisans decrease a candidate’s own vote share. These findings have important 
implications for politicians’ careers, party nomination strategies and future empirical 
research on intra-party competition. 
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After decades of prioritizing the inter-party dimension of political competition, the study of 
intra-party competition is rapidly gaining traction among electoral politics scholars. Patterns of 
competition within political parties, measured by vote distributions across candidates running 
under the same party label, provide a deeper understanding of how politics and elections are 
being played out. Identifying the determinants of individual candidate success help scholars 
and practitioners to classify electoral systems accurately and to understand the dynamics of 
political representation. 
This article investigates which role inter-candidate distance plays in competition within parties, 
by analyzing geographic distances between co-partisan candidates. Following a long tradition 
in political geography that builds on V.O. Key’s classic account of localism and ‘friends-and-
neighbors’ voting (Key, 1949), we contend that geographically close co-partisan candidates 
potentially decrease a candidate’s intra-party vote share. The ability of candidates to build an 
electoral support base of local voters depends on the presence or absence of nearby local 
candidates on the same list.  
The electoral effects of geographic distance and candidate localness are well-documented 
particularly in majoritarian systems such as the US and UK electoral contexts (e.g. Tatalovich, 
1975; Bowler et al., 1993; Rice and Macht, 1987a; Rice and Macht, 1987b; Gimpel et al., 2008; 
Arzheimer and Evans, 2012; Meredith, 2013; Campbell and Cowley, 2014). Only fairly 
recently, scholars have started to analyze the role of localism in list proportional representation 
(PR) electoral systems. Under electoral rules that pit co-partisan candidates against each other, 
local attributes are instrumental for cultivating personal votes and winning intra-party 
competition (Shugart et al., 2005).  
A growing body of research indeed shows that candidates who are born locally or have local-
level political experience are not only electorally more successful (e.g. Tavits, 2010), but also 
considered valuable resources by party selectorates in personalized electoral systems (Nemoto 
and Shugart, 2013). Other work discusses how and which voters look for local candidates 
(Jankowski, 2016; Blais and Daoust, 2017; Collignon and Sajuria, 2018). Yet despite the 
scholarly attention to candidate localness, to our knowledge not a single study has examined 
the role of inter-candidate distance in shaping patterns of competition between candidates.  
We expect that inter-candidate distance affects intra-party competition in list PR systems in two 




electoral district shapes the level playing field of intra-party competition. If a party nominates 
multiple candidates that live near each other, party supporters in that area are forced to choose 
between those local candidates and the nomination strategy can be considered suboptimal, or 
inefficient (Cheibub and Sin, 2020), from a geographic viewpoint. Spreading out candidates 
over the electoral district reduces the risk of an overlap between co-partisan candidates’ local 
support bases. Such overlaps can substantially affect candidates’ election results and in turn, 
the course of individual political careers, as recent work documents the effects of intra-party 
preference vote shares on future list positions and political promotions (Crisp et al., 2013; Folke 
et al., 2016; André et al. 2017; Meriläinen and Tukiainen, 2018). 
Second, the electoral value of earlier mentioned local attributes can work in favor or against a 
candidate’s electoral fortunes in list PR systems. Whereas the positive effect of holding these 
attributes on personal vote shares is evident, a candidate might also see her vote shares decrease 
if a nearby located co-partisan exhibits these attributes. The latter can then make a convincing 
claim of being the best local agent of representation, which will cost votes to co-partisan 
candidates from the same area. 
In this contribution, we provide the first empirical test of the effect that geographic distance 
between candidates might have on intra-party competition. We use a unique and previously 
untapped dataset of home address coordinates of 5,077 candidates in four Finnish parliamentary 
elections (1999–2011). In the Finnish system of open-list proportional representation (OLPR), 
candidates compete for votes within their party lists and their ranks are determined solely by 
their personal votes. Moreover, Finnish voters can only cast one single (mandatory) preference 
vote, which leads to intense intra-party candidate competition for personal votes. A salient intra-
party dimension and an institutionalized party system however also structure political 
competition in Finland, making it relevant to focus on geographical distances among co-
partisans. Within the context of this study, we consider Finland a most likely case for 
identifying an inter-candidate distance effect and as such, a good point of departure. The Finnish 
electoral system is furthermore an interesting reference point, since it can be seen as a 
representative of what intra-party competition might look like if the ongoing trend towards the 
personalization of proportional electoral systems in Europe (Renwick and Pilet, 2016) were 
taken to the extreme.  
As the surface area of Finnish electoral districts strongly diverges, pooling the raw distances in 
kilometers between candidates measured in the various districts in the empirical models might 




two candidates does not have the same meaning in the geographically small and densely 
populated Helsinki district as in the vast and scarcely populated electoral district of Lapland. 
Moreover, to get the full picture of how isolated a candidate is vis-à-vis all of her co-partisans 
on the same list, we need to take into account multiple inter-candidate distances at the same 
time. For these reasons we develop a novel Candidate Remoteness Index (CRI) which expresses 
how isolated a candidate is geographically given the surface area and the average distances 
empirically measured between candidates in that electoral district. 
The dependent variable is the intra-party vote share of candidates, which represents a proportion 
ranging from 0 to 1. As a result, we run beta regression models to analyze how geographical 
distance affects these vote shares, which represent the candidate’s result in the intra-party 
competition. Apart from including the CRI, the other independent variables of interest are the 
local attributes of nearby co-partisan candidates. More specifically, we analyze the effect of 
nearest located candidates’ local birthplace and local-level political experience. 
The results show that the positive effect of remoteness on vote shares is mediated by the voter 
concentration of the candidate’s party in her municipality, and also the degree of urbanization 
of the candidate’s municipality. In municipalities with a strong concentration of the party’s 
district voters, large distances towards co-partisans significantly increase intra-party vote 
shares. Moreover, we find that the advantage of remoteness is significantly stronger for 
candidates living in rural areas, towns or suburbs than for candidates living in Finnish cities. 
Furthermore, candidates receive lower vote shares if the nearest located co-partisan has local-
level political experience.  
The positive effect of inter-candidate distance is also detected when using the (raw) distance to 
the nearest candidate instead of CRI, and survives multiple robustness checks. Inter-candidate 
distances indeed affect electoral outcomes and intra-list electoral rank orders, which potentially 
has important implications for politicians’ careers, party nomination strategies and future 
empirical research on intra-party competition. 
 
How geographic distance shapes electoral competition 
He [the local candidate] gains support, not primarily for what he stands for or because of his 
capacities, but because of where he lives. 





With the assertion that gubernatorial candidates in the Southern US states poll overwhelming 
majorities in their home areas, V.O. Key (1949) sparked the interest of many scholars to study 
the role of localism in elections. What followed was a range of studies explaining vote shares 
in various electoral settings, investigating where and for which candidates friends-and-
neighbors voting is more prevalent, and discussing how the hometown advantage can be 
measured correctly (Tatalovich, 1973; Johnston, 1974; Rice and Macht, 1987a; Rice and Macht, 
1987b; Van Wingen and Parker, 1979). The degree of urbanization, size of the home county, 
party affiliation and incumbency status were often moved forward as important factors 
mediating localism effects. Other related work concluded that parties nominate local candidates 
without real chances of winning seats to cultivate party votes in their areas, a strategy applied 
by Irish parties especially in rural areas (Parker, 1982). 
Another line of research on vote choice and candidate characteristics shows that localism is 
paramount from the voter perspective. Surveys consistently find that candidate localness is one 
of the main criteria voters want to see in election candidates or legislators (e.g. Childs and 
Cowley, 2011; Johnson and Rosenblatt, 2007). Experimental studies have demonstrated that 
candidate ratings are highly affected by their place of residence (Campbell and Cowley, 2014), 
local candidate effects are particularly strong amongst voters with weak partisan ties (Roy and 
Alcantara, 2015), and that voters use local roots as signal to behavioral localism (Campbell et 
al., 2019). 
Pondering on the friends and neighbors voting phenomenon, it is also fitting to evaluate the 
effects of geographic distance on electoral outcomes. As Gimpel et al. (2008) argue, the more 
classic studies establishing the mere existence of a hometown advantage should be 
supplemented by analyses where distance is measured as a continuous predictor of candidate 
support. Recent empirical work has mainly investigated the effect of candidate-voter distance 
on vote choice. Arzheimer and Evans (2012; 2014) show that vote-likelihood is indeed affected 
by the distance between a voter and candidates for the three main UK parties, in both general 
as in county council elections. Linking voter survey data with candidate home addresses, 
Gorecki and Marsh (2014) demonstrated that friends and neighbors voting can be affected by 
external events, as was the case in the 2011 Irish elections, when economic crisis influenced 
voters to prioritize national issues over the local ones. A more recent study on candidate-voter 




constituencies than further away, and that voters’ perceptions of localness matter as well (Evans 
et al., 2017). 
By looking at geographic distance between candidates and voters, the mentioned studies have 
mainly focused on inter-party electoral competition: how can local candidates attract voters 
from other parties? Survey research shows that a share of voters is indeed inclined to vote for a 
local candidate, even if this candidate is not running for the party of preference (Blais and 
Daoust, 2017; Blais et al., 2003). But distance can play a role in the context of intra-party 
competition as well, where elections are also battles between candidates within parties (Marsh, 
1985). In the comparative literature on intra-party competition, localism has already been 
identified as an important factor in electoral systems with strong personal vote-seeking 
incentives. From the voter perspective, a candidate’s ties to the local area can serve as 
information shortcuts to make voting decisions in a highly complex electoral setting (Shugart 
et al., 2005). From the candidate perspective, these local roots are personal vote-earning 
attributes and can be strategically applied to cultivate personal votes (Tavits, 2010). Similar to 
the friends-and-neighbors voting literature, previous work on the personal vote has pointed out 
that the urban character of the candidate’s home turf plays a substantial mediating role in voters’ 
use of preference votes, and in explaining personal electoral successes (e.g. André et al., 2012; 
Passarelli, 2017). Hicken (2007) argues that candidates in urban areas find it more difficult to 
develop and maintain a core group of local supporters, as urban voters are less likely to stay in 
the same place than rural voters (see also: Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993). 
There is a clear theoretical link between the concept of friends-and-neighbors voting and local 
connection as a personal vote-earning attribute. Candidates who make a claim that they have 
strong ties to the local community and understand local needs foster the type of localism 
described by Key (1949). Particularly candidates that are town natives, have political 
experience at the local level or demonstrate their mastery of the local accent can expect to 
benefit from a considerable hometown advantage. But arguably even those candidates without 
any of the mentioned attributes are likely to receive a higher vote share in their local area than 
elsewhere, simply based on their place of residence. Voters’ place of residence co-define their 
social identities, and the place-based component of those identities can also become salient for 
them when local candidates appear on the ballot (Panagopoulos et al., 2017). 
In sum, it is likely that virtually all electoral candidates enjoy a higher degree of electoral 
support in their own local area than elsewhere. This hometown advantage substantially 




chance of winning a seat and outperforming co-partisans in terms of preference votes. The 
central argument of this article is that such an advantage – and specifically whether it translates 
to a significantly better result at the district level – depends on the geographic proximity of 
other candidates nominated for the same party. 
 
The effect of inter-candidate distance on intra-party competition 
Political parties in list PR systems are incentivized to balance their lists in terms of a number 
of candidate attributes, such as gender, age, occupation and location (Gallagher and Marsh, 
1988; Norris, 2004). Party selectorates that confect balanced tickets cater to the various internal 
factions and decrease the risk of intra-party turmoil (Valdini, 2012; Arter 2013). Moreover, 
balancing out the profiles of selected candidates appeals to different sets of voters who are 
inclined to vote for candidates who are ‘like them’ (van Erkel, 2019). Carefully crafting a 
balanced list also reduces the need for co-partisans to engage in overtly fierce intra-party 
competition, as they seek votes from non-overlapping – geographical and non-geographical – 
constituencies (Cheibub and Sin, 2020). Therefore, ticket-balancing contributes to contained 
intra-party competition and protects the party brand from the detrimental effects of excessive 
candidate personalism (Mershon, 2020).   
The balancing logic holds for locational characteristics as well, ideally leading to a 
geographically balanced ballot list with local candidates from different municipalities or areas 
within the district (Thomsen and Suiter, 2015). The geographic distribution of candidates 
pleases local party organizations in the different areas within the district and simultaneously 
appeals to voters in those areas (Put et al., 2018). Ignoring this incentive for geographical 
balance not only decreases a party’s competitiveness, we argue, but also affects intra-party 
competition dynamics and individual candidate results.  
Geographically isolated candidates, who are living in an area within the district where no other 
intra-party competitor on the list lives nearby, will be more able to build a local electoral support 
base and hometown advantage. These candidates will therefore receive higher intra-party vote 
shares at the electoral district level. Party supporters in areas with geographically isolated 
candidates do not face the dilemma of choosing between different local intra-party competitors. 
Conversely, areas with strong geographical concentration of candidates do confront local voters 




out who is the best agent of representation for their locality. The result is that nearby living 
intra-party competitors eat away each other’s vote shares. 
H1: Geographically remote candidates receive higher intra-party vote shares. 
Whereas this hypothesis argues the existence of a general link between candidate distance and 
intra-party vote shares, previous work suggests that the importance of the distance effect might 
depend on at least two mediating factors related to the candidate’s local area: its urban-rural 
character, and the geographical concentration of voters of the candidate’s party. 
Regarding the degree of urbanization, we know that friends and neighbors voting patterns are 
more prevalent in rural areas, and that rural environments appear more beneficial for attracting 
a large share of preferential voters. As a consequence, candidates in rural areas of their district 
will be more sensitive to the geographical proximity of co-partisans than their counterparts 
located in urban centers. Emphasizing local roots might be a less effective strategy for urban 
candidates, as urban dwellers move around more frequently (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993), 
are more atomized and less integrated in local communities (Nemoto and Shugart, 2013), and 
therefore less attached to local identities and less aware of candidates’ local roots.  
As concerns the concentration or dispersion of party voters in the district, candidates in areas 
with strong voter concentrations might suffer more from nearby located co-partisans. If a 
candidate lives in an area that does not contribute a large share of the party’s support in the 
district, distance will arguably matter less as this candidate is less likely to attract votes based 
on the locality argument anyway. After all, the greatest potential for an effective local candidate 
strategy lies in areas with strong voter concentrations, where the candidate shares her local 
identity with a great deal of party supporters. 
Apart from the candidate perspective, the argument for a mediating role of party voter 
concentration can be built further from the voter perspective. Following the research on vote 
choice and candidate characteristics, we know that voters find local representation important 
and therefore the idea of a locally rooted representative attractive. However, voters also tend to 
take into account their preferred candidate’s chance of getting elected (Lanoue and Bowler, 
1998; Barnfield 2019). The result is that voters are more likely to cast a local vote when a local 
candidate actually stands a chance of getting elected, which tends to be the case in areas with 




In addition to the geographic remoteness of a candidate, we contend that geographic inter-
candidate distances also affect intra-party vote shares indirectly. Candidates in preferential 
voting systems compete with all of their intra-party competitors for personal votes at the district 
level. However, the intra-party battle for local votes – i.e. the voters’ support in the candidate’s 
local area – is fought between those candidates that present themselves as suitable agents of 
representation for the locality. 
Candidates convince voters of their awareness for local needs and sensitivities by exhibiting 
local personal vote-earning attributes. A local voter might be more likely to support candidates 
who hold a local office or were born in the municipality, compared to candidates lacking these 
attributes. Whereas earlier work has demonstrated the importance of local roots in explaining 
individual candidate success (Tavits, 2010; Put and Maddens, 2015), we argue that by the same 
token these attributes can harm candidates’ electoral fortunes.  
More specifically, if a candidate faces a nearby living co-partisan who holds local personal 
vote-earning attributes in the area, this might lead to lower intra-party vote shares. Even if the 
candidate under consideration exhibits local personal vote-earning attributes herself, a nearby 
living localized candidate presents a serious local contender in the intra-party arena. We argue 
that it is particularly the nearest located candidate that affects intra-party vote shares, as other 
intra-party competitors located further away are more likely to target local voters in other sub-
district areas. 
H2: If the nearest living intra-party competitor exhibits local personal vote-earning 
attributes, a candidate receives lower intra-party vote shares. 
 
Intra-party competition in the open-list PR system of Finland 
We situate our study in the Finnish open-list proportional electoral system (OLPR), which can 
be considered a very suitable initial test bed for the effect of geographical distances on intra-
party competition. As other OLPR-systems the Finnish system is highly competitive on the 
intra-party dimension (Carey and Shugart, 1995), and a very personalized system. A distinctive 
aspect of the Finnish system, certainly in comparison to most other PR systems, is that the fully 
open-list makes it impossible for parties to guarantee the election of any individual candidate. 




which leaves voters without guidance or indicative shortcuts from parties regarding their 
preferences.  
The system does however combine these features with a high degree of inter-party competition, 
involving an institutionalized party system with eight (relevant) parties and strong party unity 
in parliamentary voting (Pajala, 2013). Parties are hence significant actors in the Finnish 
system, and the allocation of seats across parties determines how power is distributed in the 
Parliament. On this account, Finnish politics very much resembles that of other European 
proportional electoral systems using closed or flexible lists.  
The combination of strong and salient competition both at the intra- and inter-party dimension 
leads us to expect that the effect of geographical distances under scrutiny in this study, mainly 
matters for competition within parties. We hence expect voters to prioritize locality when 
choosing which candidate to vote for, but to do so within the framework of the party that they 
sympathize with the most. This assumption is further supported by findings from the Finnish 
National Election Study, where only a minority (of 10 percent) of voters state that they would 
be willing to vote for their chosen candidate, had that candidate run for a different party 
(Karvonen, 2012: p. 318). Further, previous research on the electoral success of candidates 
clearly demonstrate that local roots is a distinct and important aspect in Finnish electoral 
competition (von Schoultz, 2016). The importance of locality is recognized by parties, who 
generally strive towards a good regional distribution of nominated candidates (Arter, 2013: p. 
104). Based on these observations we consider the Finnish OLPR as a critical case with 
favorable conditions, i.e. a context in which we consider it very likely that the vote shares of 
candidates are negatively influenced by geographic proximity of co-partisans. 
The 200 seats in the Eduskunta (or Riksdagen in Swedish) are distributed within districts using 
the D’Hondt highest average method and there is no fixed electoral threshold. During the period 
1999–2011 (included in this study), the number of districts on the mainland was 14, and district 
magnitude (M) ranged from 6 to 35.1 The distribution of seats over electoral districts is 
proportional to the number of Finnish citizens residing in each district.2 Districts vary a great 
deal in terms of geographical size and the number of inhabitants, with the smallest district of 
Helsinki covering 186,37 km², and the largest district of Lapland covering 92.856,39 km².  
                                                             
1 In addition Finland has a single member district, made out of the Swedish-speaking, de-militarized Åland island.  





Nomination procedures are regulated by law and decentralized (Karvonen, 2014). Parties are 
allowed to nominate a maximum of 14 candidates or, if M exceeds 14, the number of 
representatives to be elected. Parties generally field full lists, which makes the system 
demanding for voters to navigate. In the largest-M constituency of Uusimaa, the total number 
of candidates in the 2011 election amounted to 406, of which Uusimaa voters were required to 
single out one candidate for whom to cast their vote. The extensive number of candidates, and 
the individualized style of campaigning, implies that voters are overloaded with information to 
process, while receiving little guidance from parties regarding which candidates they consider 
to be the most qualified. 
 
Data and methods 
This study uses a dataset on candidate characteristics based on public register and 
bibliographical data covering four parliamentary elections in Finland between 1999 and 2011. 
The dataset includes the home address geographic coordinates (i.e. eastings and northings) 
which allow us to calculate the Euclidean straight-line distances between intra-party 
competitors on the same party list.3 Figure 1 plots the place of residence of all candidates in the 
dataset. Whereas the blue dots represent candidate locations, the Finnish municipalities are 
colored in gray gradient where darker implies a stronger presence of candidates in the 
municipality. The map shows substantial differences between districts in terms of candidate 
distributions and densities. As district magnitude is determined by the demographic weight of 
each electoral district, we see stronger candidate densities in the southern, more populated 
districts of Finland. Furthermore, in each electoral district the candidates are clustered in and 
around the largest cities and metropolitan areas to account for the larger share of voters in those 
areas.  
                                                             
3 Information on the nominated candidates for parliamentary elections in Finland was requested and 
received from the Ministry of Justice, which functions as the election authority in Finland, and from the 
Population Register Centre. The public register of home addresses kept by the Population Register 
Centre is continuously updated and is considered to be very accurate. The home addresses are derived 
from the register 31 days before the Election Day, when the nomination of all candidates is made official. 
Coordinates for home addresses were provided by the Population Register Centre in KKJ-format which 





Furthermore, the dataset also includes candidate-level information on sociographic 
characteristics, political experience, electoral fortunes and party-political context. The 
independent variables of interest are inter-candidate distances and the local attributes of nearest 
co-partisan candidates. For each candidate we registered the local roots, operationalized as 
holding a local office or being born in the home municipality, the distance to all the co-partisan 




candidates on the list4 and the local attributes of the nearest candidate. Specifically, we examine 
the effect of the nearest candidate’s local-level political experience (i.e. holding office at the 
local level) and being born locally (i.e. in the home municipality). 
A key challenge is how to operationalize inter-candidate geographic distances and subsequently 
model its effect on intra-party vote shares. As regards the operationalization, earlier work on 
candidate-voter distances uses (a logarithmic transformation of) raw distance, measured in 
kilometers (e.g. Gorecki and Marsh, 2012; Gorecki and Marsh, 2014; Evans et al., 2017). We 
contend that following the established practice in our study potentially leads to biased results 
for at least two reasons. First, contrary to the mentioned studies on candidate-voter distances 
we are the first – to our knowledge – to analyze candidate-to-candidate distances in large 
multimember districts with often extensive numbers of candidates on party lists. As parties 
distribute co-partisan candidates geographically over the surface of the entire electoral district, 
our operationalization needs to take into account multiple inter-candidate distances. Arguably, 
the geographic distance to the nearest located competitors has a larger impact on the intra-party 
vote share than distances to candidates relatively further away in the district. This implies that 
the chosen operationalization needs to express a weighted outcome of inter-candidate distances. 
Second and most importantly, Finnish electoral districts vary substantially in terms of 
geographic surface. As a result, inter-candidate distances are naturally larger in the vast districts 
of Oulu and Lapland than in the smaller districts of Satakunta, Uusimaa and especially Helsinki. 
This is also clear from Figure 1, which showed a stark contrast between the northern districts 
and the more urbanized southern districts of the country. 
Figure 2 shows a boxplot of the distance to the nearest co-partisan candidate, grouped by 
electoral district. For each candidate in the dataset, we registered the raw distance (in 
kilometers) to the nearest candidate on the same list. The grouped boxplot shows substantial 
differences between the districts in terms of both the mean (diamond) and median observation, 
and also regarding the variation in distances to the nearest co-partisan. Not surprisingly, the 
contrast between the hyper urbanized district of Helsinki and the geographically vast and less 
densely populated Oulu and Lapland is striking, which fuels our concerns for using raw 
distances in the statistical models. For every district, the long upper whisker shows that the 
                                                             
4 If a candidate was part of an electoral alliance comprising candidates from two or more different parties, the 
distance is calculated to the nearest candidate on the list from the same party, not the nearest candidate within the 




distances to nearest candidates are more varied among the upper quartile group. In Lapland, the 
highest values exceed 340 kilometers and exclusively represent candidates living in Utsjoki, 
the northernmost municipality in Finland bordering Norway. 
 
Figure 2: Grouped boxplot of distance to nearest co-partisan candidate, per electoral district. 
 
We propose using a Candidate Remoteness Index (CRI), which takes into account the 
differences between electoral districts in terms of geographic surface, and mean inter-candidate 
distances. Instead of using and weighting the raw distances (in kilometers) to intra-party 
competitors, we group these competitors into geographic zones or concentric circles around 
each of the candidates. The radius of these concentric circles varies over the districts to make 
these zones comparable. More specifically, the radius of the first concentric circle around each 
candidate equals the standard deviation of the grand mean inter-candidate distance in the 
district.5 The radius of the second circle equals two times the standard deviation, and for the 
                                                             
5 This grand mean was calculated per district over all candidates in all election years included in the dataset. Put 





third and fourth it is three and four times the standard deviation respectively. This results into 
four zones around each candidate, demarcated by concentric circles, and an additional fifth zone 
outside of the fourth circle that constitutes the remainder of the district. 
Subsequently, for each candidate we count the number of co-partisan candidates in each of 
these five geographic zones, and attach weights to the candidate numbers in each zone. In line 
with the argument that nearest co-partisans are more important than distant co-partisans, the 
weights decrease as we move further away from the candidate. As a final step, we subtract this 
score from 1 in order that high scores imply stronger remoteness and low scores imply shorter 
distances to co-partisans. More generally, the Candidate Remoteness Index (CRI) is calculated 
according to this formal notation: 
 










Where n represents the total number of concentric circles or geographic zones around the 
candidate, and 𝐶𝑖 stands for the number of co-partisans in the i-th circle or zone. In the specific 
case of using five zones, the weights incrementally decrease from 1 (i.e. 
5
5 




weighted sum of co-partisan candidates is then divided by the total number of co-partisan 
candidates.  
To illustrate this approach, Figure 3 provides an example of a candidate running for the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) in the electoral district of Pirkanmaa during the 2003 parliamentary 
elections. Only one co-partisan candidate is located within the first concentric circle and two 
within the second circle. The majority of co-partisans are located within the third concentric 
circle which covers Tampere, the capital city of this electoral district. The example also shows 
that while the four concentric circles cover most of the geographic surface of the Pirkanmaa 
district, outside of the fourth circle constitutes a fifth additional zone including the remainder 
of co-partisan candidates on the list. This specific distribution of candidates adds up to a CRI 





This index constitutes the main independent variable of interest, next to the binary variables 
focusing on the nearest co-partisan candidate’s local personal vote-earning attributes: ‘local-
level political experience’ (1: elected councilor in the previous municipal election; 0: not 
elected in the previous municipal election) and ‘municipality native’ (1: born in home 
municipality; 0: not born in home municipality). We also take into account the candidates’ own 
local personal vote-earning attributes. 
We include the two potentially mediating variables for the effect of distance, degree of 
urbanization and party voter concentration, as follows. In order to measure the urban/rural 
Figure 3: Example of the concentric circles approach used for the calculation of the 




character of each candidate’s municipality, we apply Eurostat’s6 territorial typology on the 
degree of urbanization, which classifies all Finnish7 (and other countries’) local administrative 
units as either 1) cities, 2) towns and suburbs, or 3) rural areas, based on a combination of 
geographical contiguity and population density using 1km² population grid cells.8 
Party voter concentration is a variable that expresses which share of the party’s district voters 
is located in the municipality of the candidate. Self-evidently, these municipal party voter shares 
will be positively correlated with intra-party vote shares, but also offer a measure of the 
potential success of a local candidate strategy. To test for their mediating role in explaining the 
effect of distance, the empirical models will include interaction terms between CRI and both 
variables. 
Including these two variables, which measure within-district variation between municipalities 
in terms of urban character and voter concentration, has two notable consequences for our 
sample size. First, as we only have data on the geographical concentration of voters for the eight 
political parties in Finland with consistent parliamentary representation,9 we have to exclude 
smaller parties and lists from regionally based parties from the analysis. Second, candidate 
observations from the electoral district of Helsinki present a problem as well, as the district 
borders perfectly coincide with the capital city’s borders. This makes it impossible to account 
for within-district differences regarding urbanity and party voter concentrations: the Helsinki 
district consists of local administrative unit, which leads to one Eurostat score ‘City’ for the 
entire district and the unavailability of sub-district municipal party voter concentrations. 
In addition to this research design related argument, we believe the Helsinki district is a deviant 
case for additional reasons. As Helsinki is the capital and the political, administrative and 
economic center, the value of locality in voting behavior is degraded and local representation 
is a less important concern for Helsinki voters. Previous research indeed shows that voters’ 
emphasis on the role of locality increases with distance from the capital (Bengtsson and Wass, 
                                                             
6 Eurostat stands for European Statistical Office and is a Directorate-General of the European Commission. 
7 As we make use of the 2011 edition of the urbanization typology, some of the Finnish municipalities that merged 
between 1999 and 2011 were missing from the dataset. We assigned them to the category of rural areas, as merging 
municipalities are more likely to be small and sparsely populated. Nevertheless, to account for potential bias caused 
by this decision, we also compared the results using this approach with an alternative one where we assign the 
merged municipalities to the category of the larger municipality to which they belonged in 2011, which did not 
lead to different results. 
8 More detailed information on the methodology, and full access to the data can be found at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/local-administrative-units .  
9 Social Democratic Party (SDP), National Coalition Party (KOK), Centre Party (KESK), Green League (VIHR), 




2011). Moreover, all voters’ place of residence in this district perfectly coincide with practically 
all candidates running in the Helsinki district. This leads us to exclude the 560 candidates 
running in the Helsinki district from the empirical models presented in the article. The dataset 
that will be used in these models therefore includes 5,077 candidates.10 
Table 1 and 2 provide a number of descriptive statistics on the continuous and discrete variables 
used in the analysis. Regarding the CRI, Table 1 shows that the index score ranges from 0 to 
0.80 as a result of the weighted proportions of co-partisan candidates distributed over the 
different concentric circles. The maximal score of 0.80 implies that all co-partisans are located 
in the fifth and most remote zone around the candidate. The minimal score of 0 instead means 
that all intra-party competitors live near – i.e. within the first concentric circle – the candidate 
under consideration. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables used in the analysis (n=5,077). 
 x̅ sd. Min. Max. 
CRI 0.38 0.19 0.00 0.80 
N candidates on list 18.56 7.23 2 35 
District voter concentration 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.75 
Intra-party vote share 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.78 
 
In Table 2, more details are provided on the candidates’ own local personal vote-earning 
attributes and those of the nearest co-partisan. Looking at the candidates’ own characteristics, 
we see that a majority of observations in the dataset are not born in their home municipality 
(63.90%), but there is a majority of candidates having local-level political experience (56.94%). 
These percentages are very similar for the nearest candidate, but not identical as a particular 
candidate can be the nearest co-partisan for several intra-party competitors.  
                                                             
10 The raw dataset on the four included elections contains 8,341 candidates. The number of included observations 
was reduced to 5,077 for the following reasons: missing data on home address coordinates, candidates who were 
running as a single candidate on the party list (impossible to calculate the distance to co-partisan candidates), 
candidates who have their home municipality in another district than where they were nominated, candidates from 
the Åland islands as it constitutes the only single-member district in Finland, candidates running for parties not 






Table 2: Descriptive statistics for discrete independent variables of interest (n=5,077). 
Variable Levels n % 
Nearest candidate    
Municipality native Yes 1,765 34.76 
 No 3,312 65.24 
Local-level experience Yes 2,860 56.33 
 No 2,217 43.67 
Incumbent MP Yes 626 12.33 
 No 4,451 87.67 
Candidates’ own characteristics    
Municipality native Yes 1,833 36.10 
 No 3,244 63.90 
Local-level experience Yes 2,891 56.94 
 No 2,186 43.06 
Incumbent MP Yes 563 11.09 
 No 4,514 88.91 
 
Our dependent variable is the candidate’s share of the total number of votes received by the 
candidates on the party list, which we refer to as the intra-party vote share. Since these values 
are proportions ranging from 0 to 1 (see Table 1), applying linear regression will yield out-of-
bound estimates for some of the predicted values. A flexible approach for modeling continuous 
proportional data is beta regression (Ferrari et al., 2004). This type of model requires values on 
the dependent variable to lie between 0 and 1 and allows for asymmetry in vote proportions.11  
Candidate vote shares are affected by a complex web of determinants. The analysis therefore 
takes into account a set of additional covariates that co-explain intra-party vote shares. First, 
we control for the incumbency status of both the candidate and nearest intra-party competitor. 
Candidates that already served in parliament during the previous term are more likely to 
dominate intra-party competition than ‘challengers’ who have no prior parliamentary 
experience. Table 2 reports that only a low share (11.09%) of the candidates included in the 
analysis are running in the election as incumbent MP. 
Second, the number of candidates on the list is controlled for, as this negatively affects vote 
shares. Indeed, longer party lists systematically lead to lower vote shares for individual 
                                                             
11 Another commonly applied approach to analyze vote shares (see e.g. Shugart and Taagepera, 2017) is to take 
the logarithmic transformation and run a linear model instead. We report the results of this approach as an 




candidates. Third, we include additional candidate characteristics that might explain individual 
electoral results, such as candidate gender and age. 12 Finally, party and election year dummies 
are included in all the models to capture the unobserved heterogeneity that might come with 
this type of cross-sectional data. 
 
Results 
This section discusses the results of beta regression models explaining candidates’ intra-party 
vote shares (see Table 3).13 To begin with, we run a model including the independent variables 
of interest, mediating variables (without modelling interactions with distance), control variables 
and fixed effects. Subsequently, we include interaction terms of inter-candidate distance, 
measured by the CRI, with district voter concentration and urban-rural character. After 
presenting the results, we discuss the interpretation of the interaction effects and model 
coefficients more generally to understand its importance in intra-party competition. 
Model I does not bring support for H1 on the effect of inter-candidate geographic distance on 
intra-party vote shares. According to this beta regression model, it does not make a difference 
whether a candidate is geographically isolated from her co-partisans in the district, or instead 
lives near multiple co-partisans. Looking at the characteristics of the nearest intra-party 
competitor (H2), we find that only one of the local personal vote-earning attributes affects vote 
shares. Facing a nearest candidate who holds a local office decreases one’s own electoral score 
significantly. The size of the effect is smaller compared to when facing a nearby incumbent, 
which harms a candidate the most.  
On the contrary, facing a nearest candidate who was born in the municipality where she 
currently lives is not related to intra-party success. The same holds for candidates who 
themselves are born in the municipality where they live. These null findings corroborate earlier 
reservations on using birthplace as indicator of local roots. As argued by Tavits (2010), the 
birthplace of a candidate may not be a publicly known piece of information, or even convey 
meaningful information as the candidate might as well have lived somewhere else after birth. 
                                                             
12 Due to space limitations, we show the results of a model excluding candidates’ professional categories as control 
variables, which did not have a significant effect on intra-party vote shares. We present the results of a model 
including coefficients for different professional categories in the Online Appendix. 
13 All models are estimated in SAS STAT, using PROC GLIMMIX. In all models, standard errors are clustered at 




In sum, H2 is confirmed only for one operationalization of local personal vote-earning 
attributes, i.e. facing a nearest candidate with local-level experience. 
 




Significance levels: ***: p < 0,001; **: p < 0,01; *: p < 0,05. Clustered standard errors between brackets. FE = 
fixed effects. 
 
We find the expected result for local-level experience of the observed candidate. In line with 
earlier empirical work on local PVEA (Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010; Put and Maddens, 
 Model I Model II 
 coef. (se) coef. (se) 
Candidate Remoteness Index (CRI) 0.15 (0.10) -0.19 (0.17) 
Nearest candidate characteristics     
Municipality native -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
Local-level experience -0.13*** (0.03) -0.12*** (0.03) 
Incumbent MP -0.17*** (0.04) -0.18*** (0.04) 
Candidate’s own characteristics     
Municipality native -0.06 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) 
Local-level experience 0.47*** (0.04) 0.47*** (0.04) 
Incumbent MP 1.49*** (0.05) 1.47*** (0.05) 
Mediating variables     
District voter concentration 1.60*** (0.16) 0.41 (0.34) 
Cities -0.37*** (0.05) 0.04 (0.14) 
Rural areas -0.13*** (0.04) -0.02 (0.11) 
(ref.= Towns and suburbs)     
Interaction effects     
CRI * District voter concentration   4.93*** (1.11) 
CRI * Cities   -1.32*** (0.39) 
CRI * Rural Areas   -0.14 (0.22) 
Controls     
Number of candidates on list -0.05*** (0.00) -0.05*** (0.00) 
Candidate gender (ref=Male) -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
Candidate age -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Election year FE Included Included 
Party FE Included Included 
Constant -2.60*** (0.13) -2.53*** (0.13) 




2015; von Schoultz, 2016), a Finnish election candidate holding local office on average receives 
considerably higher vote shares. Furthermore, incumbency status yields the strongest effect of 
all candidate-level characteristics, corroborating the expectation that incumbents generally 
dominate intra-list competition and attract the highest share of preference votes. As concerns 
the mediating variables, we see that both city candidates and rural area candidates receive on 
average lower vote shares than candidates from the reference category ‘Towns and suburbs’. 
Unsurprisingly, candidates in municipalities with strong concentration of their party’s district 
voters receive much higher vote shares. Finally, other candidate-level controls (i.e. age, gender) 
do not yield statistically significant effects on intra-party vote shares. 
In order to analyze whether the role of geographic distance depends on characteristics of the 
candidate’s local area, Model II includes interaction terms between CRI and the potentially 
mediating variables ‘degree of urbanization’ and ‘district voter concentration’. Regarding the 
candidate and nearest candidate characteristics (H2), the results are identical to Model I. 
However, we arrive at highly different findings as concerns inter-candidate distance. First, the 
positive and significant interaction between CRI and district voter concentration shows that 
candidates who live in areas with a large share of their party’s electorate in the district benefit 
from increased geographic remoteness vis-à-vis their co-partisans. If, on the contrary, the 
candidate is living in a municipality that does not contribute a large share of votes for her party 
in the district, the distance to intra-party competitors does not play an important role. Therefore, 
if multiple candidates from the same area are running for election on the same party list, and 
their party draws a lot of electoral support in that area, these candidates will receive higher vote 
shares if they live more dispersed over the area.  
Figure 4 visualizes this interaction effect between voter district concentration and CRI while 
holding all other covariates at their respective means (continuous) or modal values 
(categorical). We see that the predicted vote share of candidates increases in areas where their 
party has a relatively large number of voters (i.e. we visualize the effect for a voter district 
concentration of 22.67%, which is the value of the third quartile). In areas with a lower number 
of party voters (i.e. voter district concentration of 3%, which is the value of the first quartile of 






Figure 4: Visualization of the interaction effect between district voter concentration and CRI-score, 
based on Model II. 
 
Model II also shows that the role of distance depends on the urban character of the candidate’s 
municipality. The potentially positive effect of being remotely located appears significantly 
lower when the candidate lives in an urban area compared to candidates in suburban or rural 
areas. This finding appears to be in line with earlier work showing that local voting dynamics 
work different in rural and urban areas. As urban voters are less driven by local credentials in 
their voting behavior than rural and suburban voters, the electoral bonus associated with 
distance towards intra-party competitors is significantly lower among urban candidates. In fact, 
the model even shows that urban candidates who are geographically isolated seem to receive 
significantly lower vote shares than their counterparts in less urbanized areas. It seems that in 
urban areas, candidates who are located further away from their co-partisans and the urban 
center are less able to dominate intra-party competition than candidates closer to their urban 
colleagues. This might also be caused by the fact that urban candidates who are located in the 
outskirts of the city are less able to dominate the campaign or are primarily nominated by the 
parties to ‘cover’ the peripheral areas of the city. 
Figure 5 shows this interaction effect between distance and the degree of urbanization, while 




in rural or suburban municipalities clearly benefit from higher remoteness vis-à-vis intra-party 
competitors, candidates in urban settings in fact see their vote shares significantly decrease 
when CRI scores are high. 
 
Figure 5: Visualization of the interaction effect between degree of urbanization and CRI-score, based 
on Model II. 
 
The Online Supplemental Material presents the results of a number of additional models to test 
for the robustness of our findings. Table A shows a model with an additional set of interaction 
effects to test for the relative strength of local PVEA. Moreover, this model includes interaction 
terms between inter-candidate distance and the nearest candidate characteristics to check 
whether the effect of distance is also conditional on the strength of nearby located candidates. 
This beta regression with interaction effects produces two new meaningful results. First, the 
positive effect of holding local office decreases when the candidate simultaneously is an 
incumbent. Incumbent candidates cannot fully capitalize on the value of their local experience, 
as their credibility from the voters’ perspective is already shaped by their previous political 
experience in parliament, not at the local level. Second, we find that the bonus of incumbency 




that clustering multiple incumbents in the same geographical area results in fierce competition 
for local votes and weakens the intra-party success of these incumbents. 
Table B uses the distance to the nearest candidate (in kilometers) instead of the Candidate 
Remoteness Index to analyze the effect of inter-candidate distance on intra-party vote shares. 
The results point in the same direction, i.e. distance increases vote shares in suburban and rural 
areas with strong district voter concentrations. In urban areas, on the contrary, distance seems 
to decrease the candidates’ result. A notable difference with the results using CRI reported in 
Table 3 is that the coefficient for distance to nearest candidate is significant and negative, 
indicating that the level of district voter concentration needs to pass a certain threshold for the 
candidate to not face an electoral setback. 
Next, Table C shows the coefficients of an OLS regression model using CRI as independent 
variable of interest. The results confirm that higher scores on the index increase intra-party vote 
shares only when district voter concentrations are high, and that isolated candidates in cities 
receive significantly lower vote shares. An OLS regression using logged intra-party vote share 
(Table D) corroborates these findings as well. Table E shows the results for a beta regression 
model that does not only include age and gender as control variables, but also the occupational 
categories of candidates (following the ILO classification). Although occupational categories 
clearly affect vote shares, again the main results of this contribution are not affected. Table F 
provides another strict robustness test by including electoral district fixed effects that remove 
all unobserved heterogeneity in the outcome related to differences in districts. In line with the 
other analyses, we find evidence for the complex relationship between distance, district voter 
concentration, urban-rural character of the area and intra-party vote shares. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the longstanding tradition in political geography that builds on V.O. Key’s classic 
account of localism and ‘friends-and-neighbors’ voting (Key, 1949), previous studies on intra-
party competition have largely neglected how this effect is played out in interaction with other 
candidates running for the same list.  
In this study we have contributed to the growing literature on intra-party competition by running 
a unique test of the extent to which candidates’ ability to build an electoral support base depends 




within the Finnish open-list PR system; a democracy combining an institutionalized party 
system with a highly salient intra-party dimension, shaped by mandatory preferential voting 
and (mostly) alphabetical ordering of candidates.  
We have used hitherto unexplored data on more than 5,000 candidates’ home address 
coordinates in combination with data on their political experiences and electoral results over 
four consecutive parliamentary elections (1999–2011). To measure the remoteness of a 
particular candidate while taking into account the great geographical variation across Finnish 
electoral districts, we developed a novel index, a Candidate Remoteness Index (CRI), based on 
the distribution of co-partisans over concentric circles around that candidate. 
The results, based on beta-regression models and a number of robustness-checks, show that 
candidate-to-candidate distances matter for how votes are distributed within parties. Remotely 
located candidates receive significantly higher vote shares than candidates living in sub-district 
areas that are more densely populated in terms of intra-party competitors. The effect of 
geographical remoteness is however contingent on local party strength and on the degree of 
urbanization: candidates particularly benefit from more distant co-partisans in party strongholds 
and rural and suburban municipalities. Moreover, we establish that a candidates’ electoral result 
depends on the political experiences of nearby living candidates. Candidates facing an 
incumbent MP or a local-level incumbent as their nearest intra-party competitor, win on average 
lower vote-shares.  
Our findings have potentially important implications. For scholars interested in understanding 
the mechanisms of intra-party competition under proportional representation, it is clearly 
important to look beyond the characteristics of the individual candidates, their electoral 
experience and their roots in the local community. Competition is shaped by the pool of 
candidates nominated for the same party, and – as we have demonstrated – how these candidates 
are distributed geographically within a district, taking into account parties’ local support and 
the degree of urbanization. For experienced politicians and for party practitioners responsible 
for selection processes, these findings hardly come as a surprise. A good geographical 
distribution is generally considered as a successful strategy to maximize votes, and there is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence of MPs maneuvering or lobbying inside their parties to side step 
potential local challengers.  
Our contribution further highlights the importance of taking into account the geographical 




effects on how electoral support is distributed across candidates competing for votes within the 
same party, and, in turn, on the future political careers of candidates. Not only are vote margins 
between the last winner and first loser on Finnish party lists very small, the post-electoral rank 
of an elected candidate (i.e. the order of candidates according to their preference votes) is often 
used by party elites as a criterion to allocate national or local level executive positions. As a 
result, geographical isolation allows politicians to hop over a few competitors in the intra-party 
hierarchy and boost their political status both in- and outside of the party.  
Based on the empirical analyses presented in this article, we are unable to assess whether inter-
candidate distances also matter for inter-party competition. In line with the literature on ticket-
balancing, the locational characteristics of candidates can in a similar way as other crucial 
characteristics (e.g. ethnicity, occupation, age) be balanced on the list so as to avoid intra-
organizational turmoil (Valdini, 2012). Moreover, excluding specific geographical areas from 
the list might similarly decrease the party’s overall competitiveness. From both the inter- and 
intra-party competition perspective, it is however important to acknowledge that the average 
party hardly face an unlimited supply of candidates, and that strategic intentions may fail to 
materialize when facing the harsh reality of candidate recruitment. 
Admittedly, Finland is a most likely case for identifying an inter-candidate distance effect as 
described in this article, and a confirmatory finding in such a setting indeed makes it difficult 
to assess the extent to which the result is generalizable to other contexts. The combination of a 
purely open-list PR system with a single mandatory preference vote breeds strong competition 
between candidates from the same list, and most definitely between co-partisan candidates 
fishing in the same pond of local voters. Where voters are allowed to cast multiple preference 
votes, the dynamics of intra-party competition might be substantially different and candidates 
from the same local area may be incentivized to combine forces instead of targeting each other’s 
local support bases. Our empirical explorations should therefore be considered as a point of 
departure, and regarding future research efforts, it would therefore be particularly interesting to 
investigate an open or flexible list case with multiple preference voting, such as Belgium, 
Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Norway or Slovakia.  
We have developed a theoretical argument for the existence of a distance effect, and 
demonstrated empirically that the location of candidates vis-à-vis co-partisans matters. As 
political campaigning becomes more candidate centered cross-nationally (Langer, 2007), voters 
in list PR systems are becoming more preoccupied with individual candidates and their personal 




(Renwick and Pilet, 2016), we believe that Finland will not turn out to be the unique case 
showing strong inter-candidate distance effects. 
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